What is new about the BRICS-led New Development Bank?

Originally published on Devex on 9 May 2016

About three weeks ago, the board of directors of one of the world’s newest multilateral institutions, the New Development Bank of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, met on the sidelines of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund spring meetings in Washington, D.C., to approve its first set of loans.

Valued at $811 million, this first tranche of funding will support renewable energy projects across the BRICS countries including two solar energy projects in India and China, and a hydropower dam in Russia. For Brazil, it created a credit line worth $300 million for renewable energy projects such as solar and wind power.

When the idea of a BRICS-led development bank was first announced by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa four years ago in New Delhi, it was met with a range of reactions from wariness to cautious optimism to overt celebration. Almost from day one, it was seen to be a direct challenge to existing development banks, notably the Western-dominated World Bank and IMF. BRICS governments have maintained that their bank serves to complement and not substitute these institutions.

But what exactly is new about the New Development Bank?

Three key features set the NDB apart from existing multilateral development banks: “south-south” cooperation, equity in power-sharing and sustainable development.

Each of the BRICS governments has ownership of one-fifth of the share of the Bank, which translates into an equal say in decision-making. This is unlike the World Bank or the IMF where decision-making power is heavily skewed in favor of a particular set of countries.The creation of a development bank by countries of the “global south” for the global south is both unique and necessary. It has been created to meet the specific development needs of the global south, namely those of infrastructure. Based on their own experiences as recipients of foreign aid from the “global north,” the BRICS governments are keen to ensure that development funding provided by them is free of political conditionalities and is disbursed without delays.

Perhaps the single most important differentiating feature of the NDB is its stated commitment to the principle of sustainable development. This is a departure from a business-as-usual approach.

But apart from stating that sustainable development will be linked to the financing of particular kinds of infrastructure projects, namely “green” or renewable energy projects, the NDB has been less clear about how it will ensure that these projects will be rooted in sustainable practices. Also unclear is whether and how they will be linked to the implementation of the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals. While the bank has officially opened for business, addressing these questions will be critical for the next phase of the NDB.

The NDB could incentivize governments to design projects that are respectful toward the environment and local communities. It could offer differential interest rates and repayment terms on loans given to governments, depending on the latter's ability to meet certain criteria such as their consideration of potential socio-environmental impacts of projects, project alignment with international best practice in sustainable development and integration of key components of the Sustainable Development Goals. These criteria could be consolidated into a composite index to measure the actual sustainability of projects, both in terms of processes employed and outcomes achieved.

Linking sustainable development to incentives would encourage governments to think about sustainable practices not as bureaucratic formalities or risks, but as actions ultimately linked to better development outcomes. This would be a major shift in the way environmental and social standards are currently conceived in the international financial architecture.

While these are no doubt important questions for BRICS policymakers and the NDB’s officials to consider, they also open up the space for greater engagement by civil society. Defining the precise sustainability criteria against which projects could be judged for selection is an area where civil society could provide input. Civil society could also play a critical role in providing oversight of the NDB’s lending practices by ensuring that these preagreed criteria are indeed used to inform the bank's decision-making.

The NDB is expected to inject fresh thinking into development practice. It has already laid down the framework for this by placing sustainable development at the core of its mandate. Acknowledging that sustainable development is as much an outcome as it is a process will help to further guide the Shanghai-based bank in its selection and implementation of projects. As the NDB embarks on this journey, it should proactively encourage dialogue with different stakeholders, including civil society actors, who could be valuable partners in this process.

About the authors

Supriya Roychoudhury

Supriya Roychoudhury is a researcher, published author and commentator on "south-south" development cooperation issues, specializing in Indian development cooperation policy. She previously led Oxfam India’s foreign policy program.

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Karin Costa Vazquez

Karin Costa Vazquez is an adviser and researcher specialized in international cooperation for development, strategic planning and operations. She has worked with the World Bank, UNDP, and the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, and published extensively on BRICS's contribution to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira em 2015: integração, transparência e os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável

* Read the blog in 80+ languages with the translator widget on the right side of the page!

Coincidentemente, essa semana dois queridos amigos me perguntaram sobre a evolução do orçamento da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação nos últimos anos e minhas perspectivas para a cooperação técnica brasileira Sul-Sul em 2015.  Os dados a seguir dão algumas pistas:

O orçamento executado pela Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) em projetos de cooperação técnica com outros países em desenvolvimento registaram recorde histórico em 2010. Desde então, a execução orçamentária da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul ofertada pelo Brasil tem sofrido forte revés. Tendência bastante semelhante é observada por região receptora da cooperação técnica brasileira: exceto na Ásia, Europa Oriental e Oriente Médio, onde o volume de recursos executados teve leve aumento entre 2010 e 2011, todas as demais regiões sofreram redução ininterrupta nos últimos 4 anos. Até  junho de 2013, a execução orçamentária da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira estava cerca de 34% abaixo do patamar de 2008. 

Ainda que os números não indiquem o orçamento global da ABC nem incluam os dados mais recentes, há fortes sinais de que a queda tenha continuado (e até mesmo se acentuado) em 2014. No último ano, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE) sofreu um dos maiores cortes orçamentários de toda a esplanada (quase 40%) e são frequentes os relatos sobre encerramento de contratos de funcionários terceirizados da ABC, descontinuidade na implementação de projetos de cooperação técnica Sul-Sul, entre outros.

Os dados disponíveis tampouco mostram a evolução do orçamento executado pela Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC) em projetos de cooperação técnica Sul-Sul vis a vis o total da cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento, composta inclusive pela cooperação técnica conduzida diretamente por outros entes do governo federal como parte de suas relações institucionais. É possível indagar se a ABC também teria tido a sua capacidade de coordenação reduzida nos últimos anos, e em que medida essas iniciativas coordenam e integram entre si.

Perspectivas para a cooperação Sul-Sul brasileira em 2015

A definição das abordagens, estratégias de atuação e recursos para a implementação da agenda de desenvolvimento pós 2015 traz oportunidade única para revigorar a cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira. O rumo da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira, contudo, ainda depende da confirmação do atual Ministro das Relações Exteriores ou da nomeação de futuro titular, das diretrizes para a política externa, e da aprovação do orçamento.

Três pontos merecem destaque em 2015:

  

1. Integração da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira com outras modalidades de cooperação para o desenvolvimento: A cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira tem na "abordagem estruturante" a base para a identificação, desenho e implementação de seus projetos. Essa abordagem se baseia no conceito de "desenvolvimento de capacidades", entendida como fortalecimento de capital humano,  instituições e sistemas por meio da transferência de experiências e tecnologias com potencial para promover o desenvolvimento autônomo de outros países. Apesar de serem iniciativas de mais longo prazo, que envolvem diferentes atores, e que combinam mais de uma modalidade de cooperação, pouco se sabe sobre os mecanismos de coordenação entre os diferentes entes públicos cooperantes e entre eles e o setor privado. O primeiro artigo do Dossiê CEBRI Brasil-Africa traz um estudo de caso e evidencias iniciais de como essa integração ocorre na prática e pode ser reforçada segundo os princípios que guiam a cooperação Sul-Sul.

2. Sistematização,  regularização,  divulgação e análise dos micro-dados da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul: Os dados globais por tipo de cooperação devem ser publicados com maior regularidade por meio dos relatórios COBRADI. A sistematização e divulgação de dados desagregados por tipo de cooperação deve ser o passo seguinte para maior e melhor análise dos fluxos financeiros, abordagens, instrumentos e resultados alcançados em diferentes países e áreas de desenvolvimento. Uma maior desagregação de dados quantitativos e qualitativos também ajudaria a entender como a cooperação técnica Sul-Sul brasileira teria contribuído para alcançar os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milênio e que lições podem ser extraídas para a definição de indicadores globais dos fluxos e resultados da cooperação Sul-Sul.

3. Cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS) e implementação da Agenda Pós-2015: Primeiro, a relação entre CSS e a agenda pós-2015 passa pela capacidade interna da ABC e seus parceiros em entender os fatores de sucesso das experiências de desenvolvimento nacionais e incorpora-los no desenho e implementação dos projetos de cooperação técnica Sul-Sul, segundo as prioridades de desenvolvimento e contexto local. Isso requer desde um corpo técnico próprio qualificado e instrumentos de gestão do conhecimento, monitoramento e avaliação; até uma política nacional para a cooperação para o desenvolvimento que contemple, entre outros aspectos, mecanismos de coordenação inter-ministerial e alocação de recursos. Essa discussão está intimamente relacionada à maior definição acerca da possível criação da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Desenvolvimento e Investimento. Segundo, será  necessário maior proatividade do Brasil nos fóruns globais sobre cooperação para o desenvolvimento e no tratamento da cooperação técnica Sul-Sul em regimes internacionais como comércio, direitos humanos e meio ambiente. Mais projetos de cooperação técnica poderiam ir além do intercâmbio de experiências e se integrarem mais com as agendas multilaterais de desenvolvimento. 

Referências:
ABREU, Fernando (2013). A evolução da Cooperação Técnica Internacional no Brasil. Mural Internacional, V. 4, N. 2, Julho-Dezembro 2013.

ABREU, Fernando (2013). Apresentação de Power Point. Colóquio: O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul. BRICS Policy Center, em 28 de junho de 2013. Arquivo disponível em:
http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/arquivos/e.pdf

Ten years later, how has the IBSA fund been supporting South-South partnerships on the ground?

Why don’t partners in South-South cooperation care about the aid effectiveness agenda? Why don’t they adhere to the commitments embodied in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action? These are questions I frequently hear.

Perhaps it is time to think anew.

At the Global Partnerships for Effective Development Cooperation meeting in Mexico last month, we heard once again that South-South cooperation is a common endeavor of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities.

Developing countries are indeed reshaping the international cooperation landscape with new principles, ideas and practices. The environment in which South-South cooperation is currently implemented has changed significantly since the 1970s, when the basic institutional arrangements governing it were put in place. In the 1970s, the vast majority of developing countries were underdeveloped and heavily dependent on developed countries for the transfer of knowledge and technology. Over the past two decades, a number of developing countries have achieved comparatively high levels of development, underpinned by an expanding middle class and scientific and technological expertise, and are demonstrating many competencies that are contributing to higher growth, economic resilience and other positive trends in the global South.

These developments have accentuated the possibilities for promoting more intensive forms of cooperation among developing countries in pursuit of their national development plans and internationally agreed development goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 development agenda. It is within this context that the High Level Committee on South-South Cooperation, the governing body for South-South Cooperation at the UN comprised of all members of the United Nations Development Program, meets this week to review what South-South has achieved and how its implementation on the ground can be strengthened.

Read the IBSA Fund overview of project portfolio 2014 here
So far, the IBSA Fund has contributed with more than US$27 million to 21 projects in 13 countries. In Haiti, the fund helped build a waste collection system in the neighborhood of Carrefour Feuilles in the capital Port-au-Prince. The venture employs 385 neighborhood residents, including 207 women. More than 150,000 people benefit from improved sanitation and reduced flood risk from garbage-clogged canals. The IBSA Fund also helped Guinea-Bissau to train over 4,500 farmers (half of them women) in improved techniques of rice cultivation, and citrus fruit and mango production, contributing to income generation and poverty alleviation in the country. In Palestine, the Cultural and Hospital Center for the Palestinian Red Crescent Society in the Gaza strip was entirely rebuilt, and in Burundi the revamped Center for Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS now enables around 39,000 consultations per year.

Ten years since its establishment in 2004, the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund) is a good example of how South-South cooperation is delivering results on the ground. With just USD3 million per year, the IBSA Fund is very tiny when compared to other development cooperation initiatives (the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, for instance, has invested more than USD20 billion since 2002). Beyond the financial contribution though, the Fund aims to put the principles of cooperation and solidarity in practice and set a new paradigm for development cooperation.

As emerging economies that still have their own development requirements, IBSA members are determined to distance themselves as far as possible from traditional donor-recipient relationships by supporting replicable and scalable projects based on the capabilities available in the IBSA countries themselves and on their own national experiences and capacity building expertise. And the results are out there.

The fund operates through a demand driven approach and is open to all developing countries. Governments requesting support from the fund initiate discussions with IBSA representatives worldwide. They submit proposals to the IBSA Focal Points in the three capitals for approval. Proposals that receive favorable indication are taken to the IBSA Fund Board of Directors, comprised of the IBSA Deputy-Permanent Representatives for the United Nations. The Board meets every four months to develop, monitor, analyze and approve project documents. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation acts as the fund manager and the Board of Directors’ secretariat, intermediates the contact with potential executing agencies, and facilitates project formulation and implementation. IBSA projects are implemented through partnerships with local governments, UNDP or national institutions to ensure it is locally owned and managed.

South-South principles also guide the (more or less objective) criteria to evaluate the proposals submitted to the Fund, which include: the potential to reduce poverty, alignment with the priorities of the recipient country, use of the capabilities available in the IBSA countries and their successful experiences, sustainability, expected impact, possibility that the initiative be replicated, innovation, and project completion within a 12-14 months timeframe. Funding is available for projects in agriculture, education, energy, environment and climate change, health, human settlements, public administration, revenue administration, science and technology, and social development, and other areas where IBSA countries have developed national expertise and according to the demand of the partner.

Under the spirit of mutual benefits, the IBSA Fund also supports the development agenda of the member countries themselves. India, Brazil and South Africa may agree with their partners to terminate certain existing bilateral programs and attach them to the development fund, to form a larger initiative for cooperation with other IBSA members. Thus, IBSA members and partners could benefit from economies of scale, increased knowledge exchanges, and strengthened global impact when using the Fund. As other South-South funds and facilities are created both within UN agencies and International Development Banks, it would be helpful to conduct a benchmarking exercise to identify standards or 'best practices' to enhance design and performance.

North-South, South-South, South-North, East-East…we all care about effectiveness. We also care about how the term can be framed to allow both accountability and innovation, as well as results. Would this be the IBSA Fund’s main lesson for the decade to come?

Three challenges for the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

Earlier this year, I published a list of milestone events for shaping the policy field of development cooperation in a post-2015 context. Among these milestone events is the first Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) high-level meeting, convening in Mexico next week.

GPEDC members will meet amid uncertainty regarding what sort of momentum the forum will be able to generate. First announced in 2011 at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HFL4), the GPEDC would ensure accountability for the implementation of the five HFL4 commitments at the political level: ownership, results, inclusive development partnerships, transparency and mutual accountability. 

Two years onwards, not only the quantity but also the quality of aid seem to have increased. According to the OECD, official development assistance (ODA) rose by 6.1% in real terms in 2013 after a two years of falling volumes and reached the highest level ever recorded (USD 134.8 billion). A OECD/UNDP report covering 46% of total ODA highlights that country ownership continues to strengthen, donors are sharing information on development cooperation more transparently, and there is greater recognition of the important role played by non-state actors in development. 

However, in an evolving international architecture for development cooperation there is much more that needs to be done to shift the global debate from "aid effectiveness" to "effective development cooperation" and actually transform cooperation practices. Under this scenario, some of the issues GPEDC members will face next week in Mexico and beyond are: i) the legitimacy of its agenda; ii) the effectiveness of its monitoring framework; and iii) its relevance to the development cooperation debate. 

Whose interests at stake

The GPEDC high-level meeting next week is expected to provide development actors an opportunity to review what has been achieved since the HFL4 and identify ways forward to effective development. However, a quick look at the agenda of the meeting sheds light on the actual composition of the debate and some of the interests at the table. 

The meeting is organized in five plenary sessions on the following topics: i) progress since Busan, ii) taxation and resource mobilization for development, iii) SSC/TrC and knowledge sharing, iv) development cooperation with Middle Income Countries, and v) business as a partner in development. Could such agenda be understood as an attempt to extend GPDEC's mandate beyond monitoring post-Busan performance to a role in helping frame the Post-2015 development debate? If so, what is the need for such stronger mandate given the already existing MDGs and other UN processes? Could the GPEDC more prominently feed into the post-2015 process on the 'how' global, regional and national development efforts should be undertaken, rather than the 'what' the global development agenda would be?

In addition to the plenary sessions, 37 focus sessions (side events) are expected to engage GPEDC members in in-depth discussions and gather support to voluntary initiatives around the topics of the main meeting. From the 33 focus sessions with information available on GPEDC website [1], 27 are organized by at least one OECD-DAC member and/or think-tank funded by an OECD-DAC country [2]. Only five South-South cooperation partners and/or non OECD-DAC countries (Colombia, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico and Mozambique) are co-organizing focus sessions with a traditional donor. The governments of China and India are not leading nor co-organizing any focus session, but one Chinese and one Indian think-tank are co-organizing a focus session with a German think-tank. The governments of Brazil and South-Africa are neither leading nor co-organizing any focus sessions. How representative of the breadth of development players is an agenda apparently dominated by traditional donors?

The unfinished aid effectiveness agenda

Consensus is emerging on the need to adopt a new set of rules and standards that are inclusive of the different development actors. The GPEDC global monitoring framework tracks progress on the commitment and action agreed at the HLM4 based on ten indicators in areas like gender equality and women's empowerment, untied aid, and partners using results frameworks. 

However, questions remain on whether the HLF4 partners beyond OECD-DAC countries (e.g. South-South partners, private sector, civil society and philanthropic foundations) have the incentives to report their development assistance according to this framework, and how the issues of capacity and differentiated commitments tie into this.

For example, three indicators in the GPEDC global monitoring framework measure progress towards the HLM4 principles of transparency and accountability. Indicator #4 specifically measures the state of implementation of the HLM4 common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources for development cooperation by cooperation providers.

The 'common standard' referred in Indicator #4 combines three complementary systems and processes for tracking development cooperation flows. These are two OECD reporting instruments (the DAC Creditor Reporting System - CRS - and the Forward Spending Survey - FSS), which contain comprehensive statistical information; and the International Aid Transparency Initiative, a self-publishing system with notifications to a registry that provides current management information on cooperation providers' activities. 

The CRS, the FSS and the IATI standards are primarily designed to track ODA flows down the delivery chain. Despite ongoing efforts to broaden their scope (e.g. through the inclusion of indicators to measure humanitarian flows in the IATI standard for instance), these standards are not yet ready to capture non-ODA flows like South-South and triangular cooperation, non-concessional finance, and climate finance, among others. Consequently, neither should the common standard be. 

Rule makers, rule takers...‘rule spoilers'

The GPEDC adopted a multi-stakeholder governance mechanism for itself, portrayed as “global-light and country-heavy” with high-level meetings every 18 to 24 months. However, this governance mechanism "has not been subject to an encompassing intergovernmental negotiation and has never been endorsed by the UN membership"[3]

Skepticism persists among the big emerging economies in terms of continued association of the GPEDC with the OECD-DAC. China and India openly criticize the new set-up as “too Northern” and have yet to engage. Brazil in its turn argues that discussions on development cooperation effectiveness should start among the country focal points. In a second stage, it should be taken to the High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation (in the case of South-South partners), and ultimately to the Development Cooperation Forum.

On the other end of the spectrum, Mexico, Korea and Turkey (all new members of the OECD) have agreed to participate in the DAC systems and report more systematically on their aid. Other middle-income countries like Colombia, Indonesia and Peru have also taken an active role in the GPEDC Steering Committee.

Although these emerging economies are not a unified block and have very different policy approaches to development, they generally share a disapproval of the mainstream aid-effectiveness agenda and a preference for engagements with other developing countries on the basis of horizontal partnerships, exchange, friendship and solidarity.

Many of these emerging economies have been developing their own definitions, standards, information databases and measurement systems to support the accountability of their development cooperation at the domestic and/or regional levels. 

At the global level, however, there is still an overall lack of leadership in defining norms, frameworks and instruments for such modalities of development cooperation and/or for meeting the needs of some of these countries which still play a dual role as both recipients and providers of development cooperation. 

One of the challenges for a greater engagement of emerging economies in the global development debate is the lack of a natural 'home' for South-South cooperation in the same way that the OECD-DAC is the reference point for the North-South cooperation. In fact, as the lead intergovernmental bodies within the UN for coordinating South-South and overall development cooperation, the High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation and the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) would have such role. However, the DCF has no mandate to negotiate political outcomes and has achieved few tangible results since its creation in 2008. The forum meets every two years and has few follow-up mechanisms in-between the meetings.

The efforts to strengthen the DCF are also hampered by the political incentives that countries have to maximize their individual influence through parallel discussions on the GPEDC and the DCF (or even through the absence of discussion!). Countries like Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Peru and Turkey would still be able to negotiate at the DCF through the G-77 and China, as well as individually through the GPEDC. Others like Brazil, China, India and South Africa have been sending strong messages against the current state of affairs but have yet not shown their leadership in shaping the new development cooperation debate. 

This 'sequestration' of the global development agenda could have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of cooperation. First, by missing the opportunity to substantively contribute to the implementation of the post-2015 agenda. Second, by creating additional structures with dubious legitimacy. For example, one of the proposals for the GPEDC meeting next week is the re-launch of the Task Team on South-South Cooperation, a 'spin-off' from the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness with no participation of the big emerging donors. 

The way forward

Could the GPDEC concentrate on its mandate to monitor HLM4 commitments? Knowledge exchange on how this agenda links with broader development cooperation issues and how existing ODA-focused norms, standards and systems could contribute to the development of norms, standards and systems on broader modalities of development cooperation would also be welcome. These exchanges could feed into the DCF, which would have the normative power over the broader development cooperation agenda and its links with the post-2015 process.

In order to increase the legitimacy of GPDEC's agenda; improve the effectiveness of GPDEC's monitoring framework; and ensure GPDEC's relevance to the broader development cooperation debate, at least three questions need to be answered:

Whose and what interests are really at stake during the Mexico meeting and beyond? 

Can the GPEDC set standards and indicators that are truly inclusive of the different developments actors? 

Could the GPEDC be an 'implementation arm' of the DCF? 

READ ALSO:

Part #2: Enhanced UN support for South-South Cooperation? The United Nations Office for Development Cooperation Strategic Framework 2014-2017

[1] http://effectivecooperation.org/first-high-level-meeting-draft-agenda/

[2] Only the organizations that were listed as (co) organizers and that provided a contact person were considered.
[3] See D.I.E report

Approved the UNOSSC strategic framework, what's next?

@karin_vazquez

The strategic framework of the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) 2014-2017 was approved by the UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS Executive Board in its first regular session 2014 (27-31 January) - see decisions adopted by UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS Executive Board at its first regular session 2014.

Overall, the Board was supportive of the work of the UNOSSC and the new strategic framework. The G77 (represented by Bolivia), China, Brazil, and India were vocal in the discussions. Japan also highlighted its continued support to the work of UNOSSC and triangular cooperation - as opposed to other OECD-DAC countries shy representation.

Not surprisingly, though. The UNOSSC has long been seen by the G-77 and China as a "neutral" articulator for SSC in the UN system. But does this mean excluding allegedly "Northern-driven" processes like the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPDEC) from the debate? In the run-up to the GPDEC Ministerial Meeting in Mexico (15-16 April), I would like to have seen GPDEC co-chairs and current members of the Executive Board UK and Indonesia playing a more active role in the discussions last week. Topic for a future post, João Moura...!

In the meantime, here are other highlights of Executive Board discussion last week:

UNDP continues to host UNOSSC

UNDP's own contributions to South-South cooperation lies not in trying to represent, duplicate, overlap or replace the mandate and functions of the UNOSSC given by the UN General Assembly as an independent entity and coordinator for SSC on a global and UN system-wide basis. Rather, UNDP's comparative advantage for support to South-South cooperation is through its own global, regional and country programs within the mandate and areas of focus approved by the Executive Board. The Board praised the establishment of a "Multi-agency Outcome Board" consisting of representatives from ILO, FAO, IFAD, UNIDO, and UNDP to ensure the coherence and coordination of UN support to South-South cooperation during the Strategic Framework period. 

Countries are asked to invest more in multilateral forms of SSC

The G77 and China urged member states in a position to do so to contribute more generously to the work of the UNOSSC through its United Nations Fund for South-South Cooperation, as reiterated in General Assembly resolution 60/212 in which it designated the UNFSSC "as the main United Nations trust fund for promoting and supporting South-South and triangular cooperation." The Board also encouraged increased contribution to Southern-led facilities like the IBAS fund, currently managed by UNOSSC.

More effective institutional environment for  SSC at the UN and country levels

UNOSSC will contribute to the monitoring of the UNDP global program. UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa invited UNOSSC to its Advisory Board, and other UNDP's programming units and UN system organizations were encouraged to do the same. At the country level, UNOSSC was encouraged to work with national development cooperation authorities to increase the use of the 3-in-1 South-South support architecture and to strengthen country capacity to manage SSC more systematically. 

SSC contribution to the post 2015 agenda

The Brazilian delegation noted that the implementation of the post-2015 agenda will be limited by the effective coordination of the different modalities of cooperation, and called UNOSSC to play a greater role on SSC effectiveness and accountability. The discussion on how to promote effective SSC should take place initially with the SSC focal points in the countries (including through ABC-JICA-UNOSSC project ‘Capacity Development in Management of South-South and Triangular Cooperation’), and then taken to the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) and the High-Level Committee (HLC). Once again, how does this play with UNDP coordination (and co-hosting of the GPDEC Secretariat with the OECD-DCD)? How much can the UNDP support the GPDEC discussion on SSC?

  

READ ALSO:

Part #1: Enhanced UN support to South-South Cooperation? The United Nations Office for Development Cooperation Strategic Framework 2014-2017

Part #2: Enhanced UN support to South-South Cooperation? The United Nations Office for Development Cooperation Strategic Framework 2014-2017

Part #2: South-South and triangular cooperation contribution to the post 2015 development agenda

@karin_vazquez

The six experiences analyzed in the study "Enhancing Management Practices in South-South and Triangular Cooperation" provide lessons to countries interested in how to develop, expand or enhance their capacity in SSC/TrC management.  These lessons convey both the successes and the challenges that these countries have faced when introducing enhanced management practices.

Enhancing management practices in SSC/TrC is an ongoing trial-and-learning process. 

Developing countries are actively sharing their experiences and engaging in development cooperation initiatives with their peers. Capacity constraints have not stymied the resourcefulness of these countries in producing relevant contributions to South-South and triangular cooperation and creating innovative management mechanisms. The examples of the ‘Partners in South-South Cooperation Program’ (Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica) and the ‘Japan-Brazil Partnership Program’ demonstrate that partners spent many years strengthening the relationship and developing the necessary managerial infrastructure to run joint programs, projects and other SSC/TrC initiatives. 

Organizations in charge of SSC/TrC benefit from leadership with clear and strong institutional mandates. 
The domestic development challenges that South-South cooperation providers still face coupled with growing pressure on domestic resources pose difficulties for the governments in these countries to communicate the rationale for SSC/TrC and justify such initiatives to their Parliaments and society. Leadership can catalyze political and public support in favor of such initiatives. In the Chilean case, the mandate of AGCI’s Director and his accountability line to AGCI’s Council and the Presidency were clearly defined by Law, helping mainstream SSC/TrC within the different Ministries and other public sector institutions involved in Chilean development cooperation. In the Mexican case, leadership prompted public support for innovative modalities of SSC/TrC and the scale-up of government’s initiatives, even in the absence of a specific legal framework for international PPPs.

Light, autonomous, and decentralized institutional arrangements facilitate the rapid implementation of SSC/TrC initiatives tailored to partner countries’ needs.  
Development cooperation agencies have a central role in linking the expertise available across the government with the demand for cooperation in the partner country. The Chilean experience showed that the establishment of a dedicated unit for South-South Cooperation in the country’s development cooperation agency and the use of Chilean embassies network allowed for such connections to be made and maintained with relatively little human and financial resources. This basic structure is complemented by a dedicated unit for partnership development with multilaterals responsible for joining up efforts and coupling national funding for horizontal initiatives with foreign resources. 

Integrated coordination mechanisms facilitate the delivery of the SSC/TrC expected results. 
South-South cooperation providers often face coordination challenges, as often multiple ministries and actors are involved in delivering development cooperation. Likewise, ensuring policies from different areas of government do not undercut or contradict one another is a key factor for the successful delivery of development cooperation. In a highly decentralized institutional setting, coordination mechanisms are critical to ensure the consistency and coherence of SSC/TrC initiatives. The Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica as well as the Mexican cases provided good examples of how coordination at the working level can support SSC/TrC initiatives. The cases further demonstrated how working-level coordination integrates with higher-level governance mechanisms, and creates upstream linkages with policy making.

Coordination mechanisms in the partner country’s development planning process can further help deliver the SSC/TrC expected results. 
One of the key challenges concerning effective coordination of development cooperation is that SSC/TrC is often led and dealt by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, while other forms of development cooperation (i.e. development finance) are usually dealt and managed by the Ministries of Finance and/or Planning. In many cases this has prompted some confusion in the development planning process in partner countries with regards to the coordination of development projects and their alignment with national strategies and priorities. In the Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica case, high-level representatives from each of the three partners ensured that the PSSC was adopted into the foreign policy and national plans of their respective countries. This set the stage for governments to incorporate SSC/TrC into their international relations agendas.

Domestic experiences can be adapted to international cooperation for development and different cooperation modalities can be combined, innovating SSC/TrC. 
The legal framework that governs development cooperation can create an enabling environment for innovative SSC/TrC management. The Mexican case showed that PPPs allow for more flexible development cooperation spending, cost sharing among partners, and better use of each actor’s comparative advantage. The cases further pointed to the need for legal frameworks that allow for the combination of different SSC modalities, thus offering more options to the management of SSC/TrC and to the delivery of the expected results.

Non-state actors can be a resource, not just in their capacity as deliverers of SSC/TrC but also as development actors in their own right. 
The involvement of organizations beyond central governments in the management of SSC/TrC varies considerably in the case studies. The involvement of the civil society in PPP models (Mexico) further demonstrated how the capacity to respond to a demand for SSC/TrC can be considerably expanded and enhanced to deliver cooperation in fairly complex environments. The Chile case provided an interesting example of non-state actor involvement in SSC/TrC management through the representation of the academia in AGCI‘s institutional arrangement. The mechanisms through which AGCI relates with the larger non-government sector (e.g. through the participation of knowledge-based organizations, civil society organizations, and other non-state entities in the formulation of national development policies, and in the delivery monitoring and evaluation of AGCI’s SSC/TrC programs) were less evident in the study.

Complementarity between North-South and South-South cooperation is enhanced when partners exchange knowledge about development solutions as well as official development assistance and South-South cooperation management. 
North-South and South-South Cooperation can complement and leverage each other through different mechanisms and approaches. The Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica case demonstrates how the lessons learned from the partnership with the Netherlands (in addition to funding) were key to launch the PSSC, harmonize the management practices among the three partners, and help the program reach maturity over the years. The ‘JBPP’ in turn showed how a more autonomous approach to TrC management, with fewer codified and common practices, can also help deepen and enlarge TrC. In both cases, the trust fostered among the partners throughout the years created an enabling environment for the exchange of knowledge on development solutions and management practices, regardless the approach adopted in each of the cases.

Human resources development and involvement of professionals outside the government are vital to overcome capacity ‘ceilings’ and to the long-term sustainability of SSC/TrC initiatives. 
South-South cooperation providers often face capacity constraints in relation to the availability of public sector expertise and to the management of SSC/TrC. Investments in staff training on functional aspects such as project management, coordination negotiation, M&E, in addition to mentoring programs, performance assessments and other initiatives, can help attract and retain qualified human resources for SSC/TrC engagements. The increased use of professionals from the academia, local governments, civil society organizations and the private sector, can further help overcome the time constraints (and in some cases even expertise) that many civil servants face when engaging in SSC/TrC. Thailand experience showed that through volunteer programs TICA was able to identify and deploy human resources from outside the government to SSC/TrC projects with very unique characteristics and requirements. These cases further pointed to the need for capacity development, performance appraisal, and information systems related to the volunteers to be embedded in HR policies, conferring more institutional stability over time and across changes of government.

Which examples of North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation in the implementation of the MDGs can be highlighted and increased in light of the post-2015 development agenda?

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